The Rough Sex Defense by Buzash, George E.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 80
Issue 2 Summer Article 6
Summer 1989
The Rough Sex Defense
George E. Buzash
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
George E. Buzash, The Rough Sex Defense, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 557 (1989-1990)
0091-4169/89/8002-557
THE JOURNAL OF CRiMiNAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGy Vol. 80, No. 2
Copyright 0 1989 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
COMMENT
THE "ROUGH SEX" DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
A. USE OF THE "ROUGH SEX" DEFENSE
For decades, prosecuting attorneys seeking to convict criminal
defendants in rape cases have been battling the defendants' dubious
claims that the victim "asked for it," implying that the defendant
should be exonerated of all blame for the physical attack. For the
same number of years, the "she asked for it" defense has persuaded
juries to focus more on the conduct and reputation of the victim
than on the defendant's crime. As a result, the defendant has es-
caped most if not all of the blame for the crime and avoided
punishment.
With the growing awareness of the women's movement, the
"she asked for it" defense has become more notorious in the eyes of
the public and less palatable for juries and the justice system as a
whole.' However, when a technique has proven particularly effec-
tive, defense attorneys only reluctantly relinquish it. The "rough
sex" defense in murder cases has displayed the potential to become
both the updated 1990s' version of the "she asked for it" defense
and a formidable obstacle to prosecutors trying to secure a murder
conviction in a homicide involving a male offender and a female
victim. 2
The "rough sex" defense was popularized in New York's cele-
brated "Preppie Murder" case in which Robert Chambers was
1 See, e.g., Lacayo, The Rough-Sex Defense, TIME, May 23, 1988, at 55, 55 (quoting
Harvard University Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as saying that "the 'she asked for it'
defense doesn't work anymore"); Lynch, Insult to Injury, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 4,
1988, at 17, 17 (noting the reversal of the rule of evidence which had previously permit-
ted a rape defendant to elicit evidence of the promiscuity of the complaining witness as
indicative of the growing dissatisfaction with the "she asked for it" defense).
2 Nassau County Prosecutor Kenneth Littman, who prosecuted the Joseph Porto
"rough sex" homicide, has been quoted as saying that "'[rlough sex' is the defense du
jour." Lacayo, supra note 1, at 55.
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charged with the murder of Jennifer Levin.3 Chambers and Levin
ranked among New York City's most privileged and affluent youths,
spending most of their free evenings frequenting the city's trendy
nightspots. 4 Levin had been introduced to Chambers by mutual
friends and they had dated casually.5 On the night of August 26,
1986, they met in one of their favorite pubs and, after a brief argu-
ment, they left together to take a walk in Central Park.6 Less than
two hours later police found Levin's body, bruised and strangled.7
Chambers was apprehended and later indicted on two separate
counts of murder.8 Chambers originally denied involvement in
Levin's death; however, at trial the defense contended that Levin's
death resulted from a mishap during an episode of rough sex.9 The
"rough sex" element of Chambers' defense confused the jury to the
extent that the prosecution was compelled to plea bargain with
Chambers resulting in a reduced sentence.' 0
The "rough sex" defense is in fact a new twist on the old "she
asked for it" defense. The "rough sex" defense to the charge of
murder asserts that the victim literally "asked for" the conduct that
led to the homicide and that the homicide was the result of sexual
practices to which the victim consented, and may have even de-
manded. I These "blame the victim" tactics have drawn strong crit-
icism from victims' rights groups and others who feel that "the
criminal-justice system is harder on the victim... than it is on the
defendant."' 12
3 For an in depth account of Robert Chambers' trial for the murder of Jennifer
Levin, see Stone, East Side Story, NEW YORK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 43; B. TAUBMAN, THE
PREPPY MURDER TRIAL (1988); Wolfe, The People Versus Robert Chambers, NEW YORK, Oct.
26, 1987, at 92.
4 See, e.g., Block, The Preppy Murder Case, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, July 1988, at 113, 158
(outlining the permissive social scene in which many affluent New York youths live);
Stone, supra note 3, at 44.
5 Stone, supra note 3, at 44.
6Id.
7 Id.
S See id. at 43; Wolfe, supra note 3, at 92-93.
9 See B. TAUBMAN, supra note 3, at 2.
10 See Block, supra note 4, at 158; Clifford, DA, Fearing Mistrial, Listened to Defense Offer,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 26, 1988, at 11 (Long Island, N.Y.); Kunen, Blaming His Victim, A Killer
Cops A Plea, PEOPLE WEEKLY, April 11, 1988, at 24; Linden, The Preppie Killer Cops a Plea,
TIME, April 4, 1988, at 22. Each article indicates that the length of the jury's delibera-
tions and the resultant fear of a hung jury or a mistrial compelled the prosecution to
plea bargain with Chambers.
II Conceivably, the "rough sex" defense may also be employed by a female defend-
ant as a defense to the charge of murder of a male victim; however, as of this writing, the
defense has not been employed in such a manner.
12 Hackett, When the Victim Goes on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1988, at 31; see also,
Glynn, Sex and Death in Manhattan, MACLEANS, Jan. 25, 1988, at 46 (citing the creation of
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- The "rough sex" defense has been successfully employed in a
more refined and more pure sense in two other instances.' 3 The
"rough sex" defense was, perhaps, first used in the Missouri murder
trial of Dennis Bulloch. 14 Bulloch, facing the death penalty for the
murder of his wife, claimed that he had choked his wife to death
accidentally during an episode of sexual bondage. 15 The body of
Bulloch's wife was discovered in the charred remains of the Bulloch
garage. She was bound with electrical tape and there were rags
stuffed in her mouth.' 6 Bulloch admitted to starting the garage
ablaze after he had committed the killing.' 7 Bulloch escaped the
murder charge and was convicted on the lesser charge of man-
slaughter which resulted in a sentence of only seven years in
prison.' 8
In the second instance, another New York case, Joseph Porto
killed his girlfriend Kathleen Holland by strangulation, but escaped
a murder conviction by claiming that Holland's death had resulted
from sexual practices to which Holland had not only consented, but
which she had demanded of Porto. ,9 Upon his arrest, Porto said in
a videotaped confession that he had strangled Holland until his
hands got tired and then used his high school graduation tassel to
complete the killing.20 Porto also related this story to a prosecution
psychiatrist, claiming that he had killed Holland in a jealous rage
after she told him she wanted to date other boys. 21 At trial, how-
ever, Porto's story changed significantly. Porto testified that Hol-
land had begged him to wrap a rope tightly around her neck during
sex in order to induce a condition of near suffocation called erotic
asphyxiation that heightens sexual pleasure.22 Porto claimed that
a movement called Justice for Jennifer by the National Organization for Women who
view the Chambers case as "a flagrant example of sexist laws that deny the rights of
women"); Lynch, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that the "rough sex" defense has "gener-
ated a storm of public hostility" and has led protesters to conclude that "Chambers, his
lawyers, and the court system.., are perverting thejudicial process ....").
13 "More refined and more pure" in the sense that, in the two other cases employing
the defense, the homicide resulted from sexual practices that were by design rough sex
(e.g., erotic asphyxiation and bondage); whereas, in the Chambers case, the homicide
resulted from conventional sexual practices that became too physical. Thus the term
"rough sex" took on a more literal sense in the other cases.











he simply pulled the rope too tightly in the heat of passion and acci-
dentally strangled Holland.23 This tale of "rough sex" swayed the
jury and Porto was convicted of criminally negligent homicide
rather than murder.24 Porto received a sentence of not more than
four years in prison for Holland's death.25
B. OBSTACLES PRESENTED BY THE "ROUGH SEX" DEFENSE
As evidenced by the three cases that have successfully employed
the "rough sex" defense, a defendant's claim that a homicide oc-
curred inadvertently during an episode of rough sex can raise a
most difficult obstacle for a prosecuting attorney to overcome in or-
der to obtain a murder conviction. Two mechanisms operate within
the "rough sex" defense to raise mitigating inferences in the minds
of the jury members thus precluding a conviction for murder. The
first mechanism, implicit in the "rough sex" defense, is the notion
that the victim consented to the sexual activities that caused the re-
sultant homicide and that this consent should relieve the defendant
of most or all of the culpability for the killing. The second mecha-
nism, which is most troublesome, concerns the defendant's claim
that the homicide occurred inadvertently during an episode of
rough sex. This mechanism precludes a finding that the defendant
possessed the intent to kill, a requisite element for a conviction of
murder. Under existing statutory law, a defendant employing the
"rough sex" defense can be, at most, convicted of involuntary
manslaughter.
The nature of the events leading up to a "rough sex" homicide
coupled with the inferences that the defense raises in the minds of
the jury members makes the "rough sex" defense, whether legiti-
mate or not, a particularly formidable defense to a conviction of
murder. Obviously, whether the "rough sex" defense is in fact a
legitimate defense to a homicide is a factual question for the jury.
However, it will most likely be difficult for the prosecution to obtain
sufficiently persuasive evidence to disprove the defendant's claim.
Because of the intimate nature of the events leading up to the homi-
cide, it is very likely that the only two people who know exactly what
happened are the defendant and the victim. It is also unlikely that
inferences could be drawn from outside sources to fill in the eviden-
tiary gaps because very few aspects of an individual's life are as pri-
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inferences raised by the "rough sex" defense will be especially diffi-
cult for the prosecution to overcome if the defendant appears or can
be presented in a light that will make him or her sympathetic to the
members of the jury.26 The concept of a sympathetic defendant
leads the defense to try to prove its case by attacking the victim's
reputation and essentially putting the victim on trial rather than the
defendant.27
In many "rough sex" homicide cases, even forensic evidence
will not shed much light on the events that led up to the homicide.28
In such cases, forensic evidence will conclusively determine that sex-
ual relations were in fact involved in the homicide only when such
evidence shows the presence of spermatozoa in the victim. How-
ever, many of the sexual practices most likely to be involved in the
events leading up to a "rough sex" homicide do not involve tradi-
tional forms of intercourse and consequently may not involve the
presence of spermatozoa. The consensual nature of the supposed
sexual relations will also make the absence of any internal injuries
that may be incident to typical sexual assaults inconclusive in deter-
mining whether rough sex was involved in the homicide.
When evidence as conclusive as the presence of spermatozoa is
lacking, the value of expert testimony in determining how the homi-
cide occurred is questionable and may in fact confuse rather than
enlighten thejury. Counsel on both sides can quickly and easily find
medical experts to give testimony favorable to just about any ver-
sion of the facts that the attorney desires. 29 The demand for expert
testimony is so prevalent in trial proceedings today that many medi-
cal experts derive a large portion of their income from the fees
charged for such testimony.30 Medical experts become part of the
adversarial process and, because of the frequent "gray areas" in
medical opinion, can come to radically different conclusions when
considering identical sets of facts depending on which version of the
facts the expert advocates. 3' Faced with two conflicting scientific or
medical opinions, the jury will most likely not have enough familiar-
26 It has been suggested that a "sympathetic" defendant is essential to a successful
"rough sex" defense. Id.
27 The fact that the "rough sex" defense has the effect of putting the victim on trial
has been one of the main criticisms of the defense by victims' rights groups and women's
organizations. See, e.g., Lacayo, supra note 1, at 55; A Surprise Finish to the 'Preppie Trial',
NEWSWEEK, April 4, 1988, at 27 [hereinafter Surprise Finish]; Lynch, supra note 1, at 17.
28 In the Chambers case, conflicting medical testimony as to howJennifer Levin died
became the central focus of the case and a primary source of confusion for the jury.
Surprise Finish, supra note 27, at 27; see also, B. TAUBMAN, supra note 3, at 257-76.
29 Graham, Expert Testimony, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 45.
30 Id. at 44.
31 See Marcus, Medicine in the Courtroom: How Much Objectivity?, 36 DEF. LJ. 529 (1987)
1989]
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ity with the subject matter of the testimony to make an educated
choice between the two opposing positions.32 As one commentator
has stated, "When the evidence relates to highly technical matters
and each side has shopped for experts favorable to its position, it is
naive to expect the jury to be capable of assessing the validity of
diametrically opposed testimony." 33  Cross-examination of expert
witnesses offers little help, as these witnesses, through their fre-
quent appearances in court, have become "exceptionally proficient
in the art of expert witness advocacy."34
Furthermore, the defendants in the "rough sex" cases to date
have displayed the ability to survive successfully the prosecution's
cross-examination of their testimony regarding the "rough sex" de-
fense. For example, the prosecutor did not successfully rebut Jo-
seph Porto's testimony despite the fact that his testimony at trial
describing the events leading up to the homicide was completely dif-
ferent from what he had originally told police. 35 Robert Chambers
did not testify at his trial, so prosecutors could not cross-examine
him.36
This Comment analyzes the two distinct mitigating inferences
that the "rough sex" defense raises on behalf of the defendant and
proposes a strict liability approach to "rough sex" homicides. This
strict liability approach would, in effect, abolish the "rough sex" de-
fense and thereby remedy possible perjured reliance on the "rough
sex" defense in order to preclude a conviction of murder. Section II
of this Comment considers the first inference raised by the defense
in relation to public policy considerations and the governing princi-
ples of the criminal law doctrine of consent. The analysis concludes
that the mitigating inference raised by the victim's consent is con-
trary to accepted principles of criminal law. Section III discusses
the "rough sex" defense's function of disproving that the defendant
possesses the intent necessary for a murder conviction and proposes
a strict liability rule for homicides that occur as a result of participa-
tion in rough sex. Such a rule would effectively regulate rough sex-
ual activity and serve to eliminate illegitimate reliance on the "rough
(outlining how the variability of medical science, as well as other factors, effects the
content of expert testimony).
32 Graham, supra note 29, at 47. It is not likely that the judge will be much help in
sorting through the mass of conflicting expert testimony as he probably has no more
insight than the jury into technical factual areas. Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 797, 809 (1984).
33 3 WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE § 706[01], at 706-07 (1985).
34 Graham, supra note 29, at 74.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
36 See, e.g., Surprise Finish, supra note 27, at 27.
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sex" defense. A rule of this nature would withstand constitutional
challenges that are based on the abridgement of certain fundamen-
tal individual rights.
II. THE ISSUE OF CONSENT
Criminal law and civil law have many doctrines in common.
However, the aims of each force a different application of many of
these similar principles. The doctrine of consent falls into this
category.
The overriding principle behind compensation in tort law is to
create a desirable social balance between the individual who has suf-
fered the injury and the individual who has caused the injury. Social
concepts of fairness and equity dictate that the tortfeasor bear the
burden of the innocent injured party's suffering. The law of torts
compensates victims in order to achieve a result that best relieves
the innocent party's burden caused by the misconduct of the
tortfeasor.3 7
The criminal law, in contrast, is less concerned with compen-
sating the individual harmed by a crime than with punishing the in-
dividual who committed the crime. The crime is regarded as a harm
against the public in general and must be punished to prevent the
particular type of harm from causing further injury to the general
public. Thus, a particular form of conduct that does not result in a
personal injury and is not punishable under tort law may neverthe-
less be punishable under the criminal law if the conduct is so socially
detrimental that the state must discourage it.38
The consent of the victim to particular conduct that results in
injury conjures the notions that such conduct is justifiable regard-
less of the resultant harm and that such consent bars the imposition
of criminal liability.39 When a victim consents to a particular kind of
sexual behavior and death instead of pleasure results, support for
these notions erodes. In granting such consent, the victim agrees to
a particular sexual behavior, but not to his or her resultant death.40
Inherent in the concept of consent is the idea that the victim con-
sented to a certain result-a result that the victim considered in the
deliberation process to determine whether in fact to grant consent.
It is questionable whether consent to conduct that results in an un-
intentional death should be considered when determining criminal
37 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3 (3d ed. 1972).
38 Id.
39 Id. at § 8.
40 For a discussion of the question ofjust what the victim consents to when consent is
granted, see Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 HIARv. L. REV. 317 (1895).
19891 563
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liability. Nevertheless, the criminal law considers the effectiveness
of the defense of consent as a question of degree.
The criminal law recognizes two classes of bodily invasions. 4'
The doctrine of consent operates differently in each class. The first
class of invasions involves purely personal invasions such as offen-
sive, but not harmful, touching or trespass. The law recognizes the
interest of the individual in remaining free from the apprehension
of, or the actual act of, a purely personal invasion. However, in this
class of invasions, because the affront does not involve an interest of
the state, the law protects such interests only against unpermitted,
nonconsensual invasions. Thus, the victim's consent acts as an ab-
solute defense to a purely personal invasion, which, without the con-
sent of the victim, would have offended but not harmed the victim. 42
The second class of invasions include those invasions of the
person that can be considered breaches of the peace, resulting in
harm or serious injury to the victim. In this class of invasions, the
state has a compelling interest to punish such conduct because it
violates the state's own interests. For an invasion to qualify as a
breach of the peace, it must create a disturbance in the public order
or threaten a member of the citizenry with an injury so severe that
the conduct is viewed as detrimental to the state. 43 Because the
state's interest in punishing those invasions that constitute breaches
of the peace is so closely related to the preservation of its own well-
being, the victim's personal consent is irrelevant:
It is only where the battery threatens serious injury or where it is done
under circumstances which involve a present disturbance of the public
order or tend to provoke a future disturbance thereof, that the State
has any interest in punishing it, notwithstanding the consent of the
41 Bohlen, Consent As Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 COLUM. L. REV.
819 (1924); see Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482-83, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624
(1983) (The court recognized two classes of batteries: 1) those batteries that are physi-
cally harmful, and 2) those batteries that are offensive to the individual.). The Burke
court stated:
[A] physically harmful touching is so regardless of consent. But an offensive touch-
ing is so only because of lack of consent. The affront to the victim's personal integ-
rity is what makes the touching offensive. A consensual, offensive touching is a
contradiction in terms. Hence, consent is always at issue, and evidence thereof is
material, when the alleged battery is not of the physically harmful type.
Id.; see also, Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 158, 133 A.2d 414, 415 (1957) (The court
noted two classes of batteries: 1) those batteries that breach the peace and which are
treated as crimes against the public generally, thus rendering the victim's consent imma-
terial, and 2) those batteries that are not accompanied by a threat of serious injury or
breach of the peace and that are treated as crimes against only the person, thus making
the victim's consent a valid defense.).
42 Bohlen, supra note 41, at 819.
43 Id.
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individual upon whom it is inflicted. 44
The individual cannot subordinate the interests of the state by
granting consent to conduct that is harmful to the state. "There are
three parties [to a battery that breaches the peace], one being the
State, which, for its own good, does not suffer the others to deal on
the basis of contract with the public peace." 45
These common law principles are embodied in modem statu-
tory law46 and in most modem case law.47 For example, in State v.
Fransua,48 after an argument in a bar, the defendant stated that if he
had a gun he would shoot the victim. 49 The victim left the bar and
returned with a gun that he placed on the table.50 He instructed the
defendant to go ahead and shoot him if he wanted.5' The defendant
subsequently shot the victim in the head injuring him severely.52
On trial for aggravated battery, the defendant claimed that the vic-
tim's consent to the shooting constituted an effective defense to the
charge.53 The court disagreed, citing the state's compelling interest
in protecting its citizens and preventing breaches of the peace as the
basis for punishing violent crimes regardless of the consent of the
victim. 54 In rejecting the defendant's claim, the court declared,
"Whether or not the victims of crimes have so little regard for their
44 Id. at 820 n. 1.
45 T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 187-88 (3d ed. 1906).
46 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 452
(1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.080 (Vernon
1979); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.06 (Vernon
1974); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (1985).
47 For additional cases supporting these principles, see State v. Mace, 86 Ariz. 85,
340 P.2d 994 (1959) (rejecting the idea that the consent of the parties implied by mutual
combat provides a defense to assault and battery constituting a breach of the peace);
Lyons v. State, 437 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the consent of the
victim was not a defense to criminal aggravated battery, citing the public's interest in
preventing such acts); Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957) (holding that
criminal assault which tends to bring about a breach of the peace is treated as a crime
against the public generally, and the victim cannot consent to such an act); Common-
wealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697 (1948) (ruling that the victim's consent
to a battery committed with such violence that bodily harm is likely to result is immate-
rial); State v. Hatfield, 218 Neb. 470, 356 N.W.2d 872 (1984) (stating that the victim
could not consent to physical violence that amounted to a breach of the peace); People
v. Lenti, 44 Misc. 2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964) (endorsing the view that
the victim could not consent to an assault that was injurious to the public as well as to
himself).
48 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106 (1973).








own safety as to request injury, the public has a stronger and over-
riding interest in preventing and prohibiting acts such as these." 55
The same approach was taken in State v. Brown.56 In Brown, the
victim, a recovering alcoholic, told her husband, the defendant, that
if she indulged in any alcohol, he was to beat her as punishment. 57
The defendant beat her severely and claimed that the victim's con-
sent to the beating operated as a defense to a charge of atrocious
assault and battery. 58 In rejecting this claim, the court noted:
a victim cannot consent to a wrong that is committed against the pub-
lic peace because these [violent] acts, even if done in private, have an
impingement (whether direct or indirect) upon the community at large
in that the very doing of them may tend to encourage their repetition
and so to undermine public morals. 59
These principles have also been applied to nullify the effective-
ness of the consent of a participant in a consensual sexual encounter
that became too rough and to impose criminal liability on the de-
fendant. In Commonwealth v. Appleby, 60 the defendant was accused of
assault and battery for severely whipping the victim, who worked for
the defendant as a servant. Allegedly, the whippings were part of
the sex play that the victim and the defendant engaged in as part of
a consensual sadomasochistic homosexual relationship. 61 The de-
fendant claimed that the victim had begged him repeatedly to ad-
minister the whippings and that the victim's consent to the
whippings should be a defense to conviction.62 In holding that con-
sent to sadomasochistic behavior is not a defense to a charge of as-
sault and battery, the court considered whether the state can
regulate, by the law of assault and battery, violent behavior which
occurs in private, consensual sexual relationships. The court stated:
Any right to sexual privacy that citizens enjoy, and we do not here
decide what the basis for such a right would be if it exists, would be
outweighed in the constitutional balancing scheme by the State's inter-
est in preventing violence by the use of dangerous weapons upon its
citizens under the claimed cloak of privacy in sexual relations.
[The statute prohibiting assault and battery] is not aimed at regu-
55 Id.
56 143 N.J. Super. 571, 364 A.2d 27 (NJ. Super. Ct. L. Div. 1976).
57 Id. at 572, 364 A.2d at 28.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 575, 364 A.2d at 29. The court also noted that in very few instances is the
consent of the victim a defense in a case that does not involve an invasion of a sexual
nature. The exception includes situations that involve "physical blows incident to sports
such as football, boxing, and wrestling." Id. at 576, 364 A.2d at 30.
60 380 Mass. 296, 402 N.E.2d 1051 (1980).
61 Id. at 300, 402 N.E.2d at 1055.
62 Id.
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lating sexual conduct.. . .Rather, [it is] a statute that implies, as a
matter of public policy, that one may not consent to become a victim
of an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.
The fact that violence may be related to sexual activity (or may
even be sexual activity to the person inflicting pain on another) does
not prevent the State from protecting its citizens against physical
harm. The invalidity of the victim's consent to a battery by means of a
dangerous weapon would be the same, however, whether or not the
battery was related to sexual activity. The general rule is: 'It is settled
that to commit a battery upon a person with such violence that bodily
harm is likely to result is unlawful, and consent thereto is
immaterial.' 63
The comments made in Appleby were adopted by the court in
State v. Collier.64 In Collier, the defendant was accused of severely
beating the victim after he had tied her to a bed allegedly as part of
their sexual activities. 65 The defendant asserted as his defense that
the victim had requested him to engage in this bondage and the
other sadomasochistic activity in order to help her fulfill one of her
sexual fantasies. 6 6 He claimed that the victim's willing participation
in such "social activity" 67 and the fact that she was fully aware of the
risks involved dictated that the consent doctrine operated to bar a
finding of criminal liability.68 In rejecting these claims, the court
cited the above quoted language from Commonwealth v. Appleby 6 9 and
supplemented it by saying: I
Whatever rights the defendant may enjoy regarding private sexual ac-
tivity, when such activity results in the Whipping or beating of another
resulting in bodily injury, such rights are outweighed by the State's
interest in protecting its citizens' health, safety, and moral welfare. A
state unquestionably has the power to protect its vital interest in the
preservation of public peace and tranquility, and may prohibit such
conduct when it poses a threat thereto.... There can be little doubt
that the sadomasochistic activities involved in this case expose persons
63 Id. at 310-11, 402 N.E.2d at 1060 (citations omitted) (citing Commonwealth v.
Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 620, 78 N.E.2d 697, 705 (1948)).
64 372 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
65 Id. at 304.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 305. In addition to the defense of the victim's willing consent, the defendant
contended that consensual sadomasochistic behavior was a social activity within the
scope of IowA CODE § 708.1 (1979) which states:
Provided, that where the person doing any of the above enumerated acts, and such
other person, are voluntary participants in a sport, social or other activity, not in
itself criminal, and such act is a reasonably foreseeable incident of such sport or
activity, and does not create an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach of the
peace, the act shall not be an assault.
Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 305.
68 Id. at 304.
69 380 Mass. 296, 310-11, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (1980).
1989] 567
COMMENT
to the very type of injury deemed unacceptable by the legislature. 70
The Collier court, by reasserting the Appleby court's subordination of
an individual's right to sexual privacy to the state's interest "in
preventing violence by the use of dangerous weapons upon its citi-
zens under the claimed cloak of privacy in sexual relations," 7'
joined the Appleby court in rejecting the notion that consent to sex-
ual relations mitigates in even the slightest way the blame for any
serious injury that results from those relations.
The holdings of Fransua72 and Brown 73 show the established
rule that the state is unquestionably authorized to protect its inter-
ests by punishing the perpetrators of those batteries that constitute
breaches of the peace, despite the fact that the victim consented to
the conduct that caused the injury. Thus, these cases stand for the
proposition that the victim's consent is completely irrelevant to the
determination of criminal liability where the victim has been seri-
ously injured. The decisions in Appleby and Collier establish that this
unquestionable state right encompasses episodes of consensual sex-
ual activity when the nature of the sexual activity results in a serious
injury. The Appleby and Collier courts in fact flatly rejected, as against
both public policy and the state's compelling interest in protecting
its citizens, the defendants' claims that their criminal liability should
be excused because the victims' injuries occurred during consensual
rough sex. In short, these courts rejected the mitigating inference
of the "rough sex" defense that the consent of the victim renders
the defendant less blameworthy or completely blameless in cases in-
volving assault and battery. If this inference is appropriately re-
jected as against public policy in cases involving assault and battery,
then, most certainly, this inference as well as any benefits it may be-
stow upon a defendant are unjustified in cases involving homicide.
III. A STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH TO A "ROUGH SEX" HOMICIDE
A. INTENT AND STRICT LIABILITY
The second objective of the "rough sex" defense is to eliminate
the possibility that the defendant possessed the intent to kill, proof
of which is necessary to gain a conviction of murder. Because the
penalty for murder involves an extensive loss of personal liberty
and, in some jurisdictions, capital punishment, the prosecution in a
murder must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
70 Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 307.
71 Id- at 306; Appleby, 380 Mass. at 310, 402 N.E.2d at 1060.
72 State v. Fransua, 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106 (1973).
73 State v. Brown, 143 N.J. Super. 571, 364 A.2d 27 (NJ. Super. Ct. L. Div. 1976).
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intended to take the life of his victim.74 However, a defendant rely-
ing on the "rough sex" defense is claiming that the death occurred
inadvertently as a consequence of the rough sexual activity. These
circumstances force the conclusion that the defendant lacked the
requisite intent to kill the victim, thus making a conviction of mur-
der an impossibility.
Early common law viewed defendants who committed homi-
cides in the perpetration of felonies as worthy of the punishment for
murder, even though these defendants lacked the intent to kill nec-
essary for a murder conviction. The common law dealt with this
problem by creating a class of homicides called felony-murders that
provided for a murder conviction even though the defendant may
have lacked the intent to kill at the time of the homicide. A similar
approach should be used in homicides committed during episodes
of rough sex. Under such a strict liability approach, the defendant,
who by his or her conduct caused the death of his or her partner
through rough sexual practices, would be found guilty of murder
even though the defendant may have lacked the intent to kill. In
effect, the "rough sex" defense would be abolished. Such abolition
would end the evidentiary problems that the defense presents for
the prosecution and would eliminate the great potential for abuse of
the defense through perjured reliance on the mitigating inferences
that necessarily follow from a claim of homicide by "rough sex."
B. LEGISLATION
The enactment of a strict liability approach to "rough sex"
homicides could be achieved through legislative action. The legisla-
tion must be drafted carefully in order to ensure that only those
homicides that result from unjustifiably risky sexual relations, ac-
cording to existing societal standards, will fall under its scope. This
requires a precise definition of the types of sexual relations that con-
stitute "rough sex."
One possibility is to define "rough sex" in terms of the types of
sexual activity that the statute is designed to include. Sexual prac-
tices such as erotic asphyxiation, 75 sadomasochism, bondage, and
other sexual practices which involve a high degree of physicality
may be expressly included under the definition of "rough sex."
However, a definition of this nature suffers from the same type of
evidentiary problems presented by the "rough sex" defense itself.
74 C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 341 (3d ed. 1984). -
75 Erotic asphyxiation has been described as "often-fatal." Herceg v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987).
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If "rough sex" is defined in terms of certain types of sexual activi-
ties, all a defendant need do is claim that the resultant homicide
occurred in a form of sexual activity not covered by the statute. As
discussed earlier, it is very difficult for the prosecution to refute
such a claim.
Perhaps a-better way to define "rough sex" is to look at the
cause of the victim's death. If the victim of a homicide that is
claimed to be the inadvertent result of sexual activity died because
of a physical injury such as a broken neck, strangulation, choking, or
a severe beating, the homicide would fall under the scope of the
"rough sex" statute and would be subject to strict liability treat-
ment. This would take out of the realm of the "rough sex" statute
truly remote causes of sexually related death such as heart failure or
other physiological causes that may be regarded as natural.
Judicial treatment of statutes embodying governmental regula-
tion of the private affairs of individuals is well documented. Courts
have not denied the state's power to regulate aspects of an individ-
ual's private life provided that the state has a compelling interest to
do so and that the statute designed to regulate such conduct is
drafted to function precisely to achieve the legitimate state interest.
This point is well illustrated by the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Griswold v. Connecticut.76 In holding unconstitutional a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptive devices for
the purpose of preventing conception, the Court saw the primary
evil of the statute being that it conflicted with the common principle
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities consti-
tutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."'77 Other statutes, while professing to address
legitimate and concrete state interests such as public health, in real-
ity only address the state legislature's perception of society's proper
moral stance, a statutory basis that has met with a cool reception in
the courts. 78
76 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77 Id. at 485 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). This view is
reinforced by the comments made by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion:
[I]t is clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a
more discriminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one, sweep
unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt with and in-
truding upon the privacy of all married couples. Here, as elsewhere, precision of
regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms.
Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
78 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971) (A Massachusetts statute that
stringently regulated distribution of contraceptive materials had no relation whatsoever
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In drafting a "rough sex" homicide statute both of these pitfalls
should be reasonably easy to avoid. Although a "rough sex" homi-
cide statute would be sweeping in its application, it would not be
designed to protect individuals or prohibit activity in a certain class
and should not be drafted as such. A society-wide application of the
statute is conducive to its effective application, and this realization
should preclude it from being deemed overbroad. Also, because a
"rough sex" homicide statute is in fact directed toward a readily
identifiable state interest rather than being covertly geared toward
subjective ideas of social morality, precise drafting to achieve its
purpose should be possible.
C. STRICT LIABILITY RATIONALE
Because a strict liability approach ignores claims of mistake or
inadvertence and refuses to consider any excuse for various forms of
conduct,79 this doctrine has been employed only in instances when
the goals of the criminal law can best be achieved by its use. For
instance, it has been suggested that the felony-murder rule evolved
to reflect the societal judgment that a felony that causes a death
should be punished more as a murder than merely as the underlying
felony. 80 Further, in United States v. Dotterweich,1 the Supreme Court
considered whether a corporate president could be prosecuted
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as a "person" who had
shipped tainted products in interstate commerce, regardless of the
fact that he had nothing to do with the shipment.8 2 The Court rec-
ognized the regulatory utility of employing a strict liability approach
in such a case in the interest of the public good:
[This] prosecution ... is based on a now familiar type of legislation
whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such legisla-
tion dispenses with the conventional requirement of criminal con-
duct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good [the statute] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger.83
Other examples of the criminal law employing a strict liability
to the state's professed objectives of deterring premarital sex and regulating the distri-
bution of potentially harmful contraceptive devices. Rather, the statute could more ap-
propriately be viewed as a prohibition on contraception per se.).
79 H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 123 (1968).
80 Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
359, 363 (1985).
81 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
82 Id. at 281.
83 Id. at 280-81.
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approach in response to a specific goal, and closely related to a strict
liability approach to "rough sex" homicides, are statutes that pro-
scribe the mere possession of narcotics or certain types of weapons
regardless of whether the defendant intended to use them.84 Even
though mere possession is not in itself dangerous, it has been sug-
gested that the criminal law ignores the actual intent of the defend-
ant because "[t]he denial of harmful intent in such a situation is too
facile. Sources of contrary evidence persuasive beyond a reasonable
doubt are likely to be absent even if the defensive theory is
perjurious. 85
The application of a strict liability approach to instances of
mere possession of dangerous instruments without regard for the
defendant's intent to use those instruments acknowledges the im-
possibility of proving the defendant's intent. Both disproving the
defendant's claim that he had no intention to use the instrument he
possessed and refuting a defendant's claim that a homicide occurred
during rough sex involve similar evidentiary problems. Namely, in
each instance, no source of reliable evidence is available to disavow
the defendant's claim.
The claim of a homicide caused by rough sex and the mitigating
inferences that it raises regarding the consent of the victim and the
absence of an intent to kill are, in most cases, almost certain to raise
at least a reasonable doubt in the minds of thejury as to the defend-
ant's guilt. Due to the extremely private nature of sexual relations
and the improbability of there being any witnesses to the events that
led up to the homicide, the prosecution will most likely not be able
to acquire sufficiently persuasive evidence to erase the reasonable
doubts created by the "rough sex" defense.86 Many times, forensic
evidence, rather than helping the jury to determine exactly what
happened, will serve further to confuse the jury through conflicting
expert medical testimony.87 Also, in the "rough sex" homicide
cases to date, cross-examination has not been effective in clarifying
the issues for the jury. 8 A reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury members is all that it takes to preclude a finding that the de-
84 See People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 42, 489 P.2d 1361, 1371, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43
(1971) (Concerning statutes that prohibit mere possession of a potentially dangerous
instrument, the court stated, "rather than simply proscribing the use of such instru-
ments, the Legislature has sought to prevent such use by proscribing their mere posses-
sion. In order to insure the intended prophylactic effect, the intent or propensity for
violence of the possessor has been rendered irrelevant.").
85 Crump & Crump, supra note 80, at 376.
86 See supra section I.B.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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fendant is guilty of murder.8 9
As a result, it is very possible that a defendant employing the
"rough sex" defense negates the possibility that he or she will be
found guilty of murder whether or not there was in fact any rough
sex involved in the homicide. The claim of "rough sex" offers the
defendant a convenient way to preclude a conviction of murder even
if the claim of "rough sex" is not legitimate.
The criminal law recognizes society's interest in disallowing the
potentially dangerous offense of possession of drugs or weapons to
be vitiated by an inability to prove the intent to use beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. It also realizes the potential for perjury if proof of
intent to use were required. Based on these insights, the criminal
law has responded to the problem by punishing possession of such
drugs or weapons as if the intent to use was present.
In light of the public interest in not allowing a defendant to
escape a murder conviction by employing an easily perjured defense
because its legitimacy can most likely not be refuted by criminal
prosecutors, a strict liability approach that would in effect preclude
the use of the "rough sex" defense seems appropriate to remedy the
problems presented by its use. This strict liability approach would
prevent defendants from literally getting away with murder through
reliance on a possibly perjured "rough sex" defense. Such an ap-
proach would also nullify the illegitimate benefit that the defendant
derives from the operation of the first mitigating inference raised by
the defense-the consent of the victim-which is not justifiable
under the principles of the criminal law.90
In addition to the policy of avoiding incentives or rewards for
perjury, other policies that have been cited as justifications for the
continuing and widespread existence of the felony-murder rule also
add support for a strict liability approach to homicides that occur as
a result of rough sex.91 The strict liability approach to "rough sex"
homicides may act to deter an individual who would kill intention-
ally if he or she had the benefit of claiming that it was an accident
under the "rough sex" defense. This strict liability approach, like
the felony-murder rule, is the sort of "simple, commonsense, readily
enforceable, and widely known principle that is likely to result in
89 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, at § 341.
90 See supra Section II.
91 See Crump & Crump, supra note 80 (authors note that, despite scholarly criticism,
the felony-murder doctrine has been retained in most jurisdictions; authors further offer
a series of policy considerations which support the doctrine).
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deterrence."92 There is a growing body of evidence that suggests
that serious crime may be deterred if the consequences of the act
are adequately communicated. 93
A strict liability approach to "rough sex" homicides would also
prevent defendants from escaping murder convictions under what
much of the public views as the suspect contentions of the "rough
sex" defense.94 Punishments perceived as lenient for crimes that
take human life give the appearance that the criminal justice system
does not condemn the activity and has come to devalue human
life.95 Punishing these crimes as it seems they should be punished
reasserts the fairness of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the
public.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A strict liability approach to "rough sex" homicide is immedi-
ately open to attack on the constitutional ground of abridging fun-
damental individual rights. Primarily, such an approach is likely to
be contested as an unconstitutional encroachment on the individ-
ual's right to privacy on the basis that it constitutes an inappropriate
restraint on private, consensual sexual relations. Additionally, the
prospect of imposing a penalty for murder without considering
whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill may also
bring about constitutional challenges on the ground that such a
practice is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment.
As the following discussion will illustrate, statutes regulating
certain aspects of what has been deemed to be an individual's pri-
vate life, such as conduct within the marital relationship and private,
consensual sexual conduct, have been held to be unconstitutional
infringements of the individual's right to privacy. 96 However, a stat-
ute dealing with "rough sex" homicide will prove to be constitution-
92 Id. at 370-71 (authors use the quoted language in describing the deterrent quali-
ties of the felony-murder rule).
93 Id. at 370 (citing E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 113 (1975); J. WILSON,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME ch. 8 (1977); Greenwood, Controlling the Crime Rate Through Im-
prisonment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 14 (J. Q. Wilson ed. 1983)).
94 See, e.g., Kunen, supra note 10, at 24 (stating that many feel that Robert Chambers
received only a "slap on the wrist" for killingJennifer Levin).
95 Crump & Crump, supra note 80, at 367-68.
96 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives is an impermissible encroachment
on the protected zone of privacy within the marital relationship); Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (holding two Pennsylvania statutes that
criminalized private, consensual sexual conduct to be a violation of the participants'
right to privacy).
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ally sound. In addition, the following analysis will show that a strict
liability approach to homicides that occur during rough sex is not
likely to be held violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.
1. The Right to Privacy
The concept of a legally protected right to privacy was first
presented in a famous law review article by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis.97 However, the possibility of such a legal right was
not addressed by the Supreme Court until Justice Brandeis, in his
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,98 suggested that the
Constitution conferred on the people the highly valued right "to be
let alone" by the government. 99 Gradually, the Supreme Court has
recognized and advanced a right to privacy primarily as a liberty
guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment's due process protec-
tion, 100 and also under equal protection arguments' 0 and the pro-
visions of the ninth amendment.10 2
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'03 the Supreme Court, by holding a
Connecticut statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptive
devices for the purpose of preventing conception unconstitutional,
expressly recognized for the first time a constitutional right of pri-
vacy under the penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. 04 The Court held that the statute had overstepped its per-
missible bounds as it had the effect of regulating conduct within the
marital relationship, a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. 10 5
Three years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'0 6 the Court held a Massa-
97 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
98 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
99 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to choose
to terminate her pregnancy is part of the fundamental right to privacy protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the privacy rights of married individuals are guaranteed by the
due process clause).
101 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (employing the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to hold a Massachusetts statute that
criminalized the distribution of contraceptives as violative of single person's constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942) (rec-
ognizing privacy in procreation through the use of an equal protection analysis).
102 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (asserting that the
privacy rights of married individuals are derived from the words of the ninth
amendment).
103 381 U.S. at 479.
104 Id. at 485.
105 Id.
106 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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chusetts statute criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives un-
constitutional as violative of single person's privacy rights under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 07 In doing
so, the Court arguably extended the right of privacy to non-married
couples by stating "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'' 08 In
addition, Roe v. Wade' 09 extended the right of privacy to include a
woman's fundamental right to have an abortion under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment."10
The logical extension of this line of cases is to consider whether
private, consensual sexual relations fall within the scope of the con-
stitutionally protected right of privacy that has been established.
This has been achieved primarily through constitutional challenges
to statutes that prohibit private, consensual sodomy.' 11 About one
half of the states have declared their sodomy statutes as violative of
constitutionally protected rights 1 2 and have reformed them accord-
ingly.t '1 However, the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Georgia statute which prohibited private, consensual
sodomy, expressly refused to include homosexual relations in the
scope of the constitutionally protected right of privacy, and left it to
the states to determine whether to prohibit such activity.' 1 4
However, like the other fundamental rights delineated in the
Constitution, the fundamental right to privacy shaped by the pre-
ceding series of cases is not absolute. The standard set forth by
John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty regarding the relationship
between governmental power and the liberty of its citizens is at the
root ofjudicial treatment of that issue in this country.' 1 5 Mill stated
that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
107 Id. at 453.
108 Id.
109 413 U.S. 113 (1973).
110 Id. at 152-53.
11I These statutes can be seen as embodying governmental regulation of private, con-
sensual sexual behavior. For a discussion of constitutional challenges to statutes prohib-
iting private, consensual sodomy, see Note, Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A
Comparative Analysis, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 253 (1981).
112 See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
113 "Reformed" is a more appropriate term than "repealed" as the states have re-
tained the sections of the sodomy statutes dealing with sexual relations I) by force, 2)
with children, and 3) with incompetents. Note, supra note 111, at 255.
114 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
115 See Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 96-98, 415 A.2d at 50-51; H. PACKER, supra note 79, at 266.
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over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others," and that, in order to justify compelling an
individual to a course of action against his free will, "the conduct
from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce
evil to someone else." 116 Mill's philosophy summed up the liberta-
rian view of the legitimate aims of government that pervaded polit-
ical thought in colonial America. 17 Of liberty and government, the
libertarians wrote, "it is foolish to say, that Government is con-
cerned to meddle with the private Thoughts and Actions of Men,
while they injure neither the Society, nor any of its Members."' "
The libertarians saw government as "being intended to protect Men
from the injuries of one another, and not direct them in their own
Affairs, in which no one is interested but themselves ... ."119
The views of Mill and the libertarians illustrate that, while an
individual should be able to realize his personal liberty through the
free exercise of his fundamental rights, conduct which can be shown
to be injurious to others is subject to legitimate governmental re-
straint. The test of whether governmental restraint on individual
behavior is in fact justified has been described as the "harm fac-
tor."'120 In order to justify abridging an individual's fundamental
rights the state must empirically prove first that the individual's con-
duct has caused harm in the past or will do so in the future. The
state must also ultimately prove that society or an individual has in
fact been injured. Scrutinizing a particular behavior's "harm factor"
to determine whether it is subject to governmental regulation "de-
picts a strong mutuality of respect between the citizen's personal
autonomy and the majoritarian interest . . .and has been subse-
quently incorporated within [the American] jurisprudential
system."121
The "harm factor" has most obviously been applied in a series
of cases involving constitutional challenges to state statutes which
prohibit private, consensual sodomy-cases that were spawned by
the Supreme Court's delineation of a constitutional right to privacy.
The cases of Commonwealth v. Bonadio 122 and People v. Onofre 123 are
representative of such application.
116 J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
117 See Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right To Be
Let Alone, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 705, 706-07 (1985).
118 Id. at 707.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 708.
121 Id.
122 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
123 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980).
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In Bonadio, the court overturned two Pennsylvania statutes 124
that prohibited voluntary deviate sexual intercourse between un-
married persons on the grounds that the statute discriminated
against unmarried persons and thus violated their equal protection
rights. The court recognized the state's ability to exercise its police
power in order to regulate public health, safety, welfare, and morals,
but stated that such police power is not unlimited.1 25 In order for
the state to be justified in exercising its police authority on behalf of
the public, it must appear that the interests of the public in general,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such inter-
ference and that the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. 126 The court held that the Pennsylvania statutes
served none of the states' legitimate roles in regulating public mo-
rality,1 27 but only served the illegitimate purpose of regulating the
conduct of consenting adults. Finally, with regard to the state's abil-
ity to regulate morals via its police powers, the court declared that
"the police power should properly be exercised to protect each indi-
vidual's right to be free from interference in defining and pursuing
his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons
whose conduct does not harm others."'128
A similar stance was taken in Onofre where the court held a New
York statute prohibiting consensual sodomy to be unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds as it only proscribed heterosexual ac-
tivity between unmarried persons. 129 The court acknowledged the
fact that "personal sexual conduct is a fundamental right, protected
by the right to privacy because of the transcendental importance of
sex to the human condition, the intimacy of the conduct, and its
relationship to a person's right to control his or her own body."' 30
The court, however, qualified this fundamental right by saying that
124 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon Supp. 1980) states in pertinent part that
"[a] person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse... is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Purdon Supp. 1980) defines "de-
viate sexual intercourse" as "[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus between human
beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an
animal."
125 Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49.
126 Id. (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
127 The court enumerated the state's legitimate roles as 1) protecting the public from
inadvertent offensive displays of sexual behavior, 2) preventing people from being
forced against their will to submit to sexual contact, 3) protecting minors from being
sexually used by adults, and 4) eliminating cruelty to animals. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49.
128 Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50 (emphasis in original).
129 People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 271, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 569 (1980).
130 Id. at 270, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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the right of privacy is not absolute, and that "to the extent that cer-
tain conduct has the potential for working harm, the State may re-
strict it."131
In other constitutional cases involving -the right to privacy
which do not directly involve the right to engage in a particular form
of private, consensual sexual relations, the consideration of the
"harm factor" has taken the form of scrutinizing a state's "compel-
ling interest" to regulate a certain form of behavior under the au-
thority of the state's police power. In order for a state to abridge
statutorily an individual's fundamental rights, the statute must be
intimately related to achieving a compelling state interest.13 2 In
other words, if the state can establish that a statute is directly related
to furthering what has been recognized as a legitimate state interest,
such as protecting its citizens from harm, the statute is held to be
constitutionally sound even though it conflicts with fundamental in-
dividual rights.
The series of Supreme Court cases that set the boundaries of
the constitutional right to privacy did so by invalidating state stat-
utes because they lacked the required relation to a compelling state
interest. In Griswold,'33 a Connecticut statute that prohibited the
distribution of contraceptive devices for the purpose of preventing
conception was held unconstitutional on the grounds that the con-
tested statute swept "unnecessarily broadly" in seeking "to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
.... "134 In Eisenstadt,13 5 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts stat-
ute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single persons on
equal protection grounds, stating that such a distinction was not
reasonably related to the statute's objective of prohibiting sexual re-
lations outside the marital bond.'36 Likewise, in Roe v. Wade,'3 7 the
Court invalidated an anti-abortion statute because it was insuffi-
ciently related to the state's interest in protecting the potential life
and the life of the mother which were not implicated until the third
trimester of pregnancy. 138 Presumably, each of these statutes would
have been held constitutionally sound, even though they infringe
upon an aspect of an individual's privacy right, if the state had been
131 Id. at 271, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
132 Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There a Right to Privacy?, 37 Am. U.L. REv. 487, 498-99
(1988).
133 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
134 Id. at 485.
135 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
136 Id. at 449.
137 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138 Id. at 154, 163-64.
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able to establish a strong relationship between the statute and a
compelling state interest.
The prevention of harm to its citizenry has been recognized
continually throughout the history of American jurisprudence as a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power. The state may re-
strict activity that would normally fall within the individual's right of
privacy if such activity has the potential to harm another individ-
ual.13 9 It has been suggested that such restrictions on the rights of
the individual are in fact necessary in order to further the liberty of
the other members of society-potential victims of the harmful con-
duct. The effect that a "rough sex" homicide statute would have on
the individual's private life-probably reducing the practice of
highly physical forms of sexual relations-is clearly in the interest of
restricting activity that has a very real potential to harm another
individual.
In reality, unlike the traditional sodomy statute, the "rough
sex" homicide statute would not criminalize any sort of behavior
whatsoever. With such a strict liability rule in operation, those who
wish to engage in rough sex are in no way punishable. The only
instance where such activity becomes punishable is where such con-
duct results in a homicide. In effect, it is not the sexual practices
that are criminalized or proscribed, but rather the homicide that re-
sults from those practices. In fact, the "rough sex" homicide statute
would be purely regulatory. By punishing only that sexual behavior
that results in a homicide, individuals are not discouraged from en-
gaging in the sexual behavior of their choice, but rather are en-
couraged to engage in such practices in a manner that is safe for
both participants.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 140 has
made it unclear to what extent private, consensual sexual relations
are protected by the fundamental constitutional right to privacy. In
Bowers, the Court refused to extend such protection to private, con-
sensual homosexual relations in upholding the constitutionality of a
Georgia sodomy statute.' 4' This decision left to the states the
power to determine whether to regulate this aspect of an individ-
ual's private life. It remains to be seen what impact this decision will
139 The harm need not be committed against a readily identifiable individual. It is
rather the probability of harm to another-whether that "other" is readily identifiable or
not-that justifies governmental intrusion on an individual's right to engage in a particu-
lar form of conduct. H. PACKER, supra note 79, at 266-67.
140 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a discussion of the right of privacy in relation to the
Bowers v. Hardwick decision, see Note, supra note 132.
141 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
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have on private, consensual heterosexual relations as well as on
other areas of the right of privacy, particularly the right to have an
abortion established in Roe v. Wade.142 A trend in this direction
would make it much easier for states to regulate legitimately aspects
of an individual's private life. Such a trend would also serve to
strengthen significantly an already very strong case regarding the
permissibility of the "rough sex" homicide statute's regulatory func-
tion over an individual's private life.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The second probable constitutional challenge to a strict liability
approach to "rough sex" homicides is that such an approach consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment. The concept of a prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment originated from a desire to
end such barbaric punishments as crucifixion, burning at the stake,
and public vivisection. 143 The British Bill of Rights, adopted by Par-
liament in 1689, contained a provision "prohibiting excessive bail,
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments," 144 and these
words were adopted verbatim into the eighth amendment of the
Constitution. Because these words were taken straight from the
British Bill of Rights, there was little debate over the phrasing of the
eighth amendment when it was incorporated into the Bill of Rights
of the United States.145 For this reason, there is little to examine to
determine what types of punishments are meant to be included
under the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Wilkerson v.
Utah 146 and determined that "it is safe to affirm that punishments of
torture.., and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by [the eighth amendment] to the Constitution."1 47 This
holding both established that the eighth amendment prohibits tor-
ture and other such medieval methods of punishment and raised the
question as to whether the prohibition against cruel and unusual
142 Many see the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick as the beginning of the end for the
rights established in Roe v. Wade. Eleanor Smeal of the National Organization for Wo-
men has been quoted as saying, "If Roe is ever reversed, this is exactly the way the
decision will be written." Colson, What the Sodomy Ruling Really Means, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Sept. 19, 1986, at 72; see also, Carlin, Two Doctrines of Privacy, AMERICA, August 9,
1986, at 50 (predicting that "the Georgia decision... portends ... at least a partial
reversal of Roe v. Wade.")
143 See I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1965).
144 Id. at 166.
145 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
146 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
147 Id. at 136.
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punishment stopped there or prohibited any form of punishment
which society now deems or will come to regard as cruel and unu-
sual. The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the concept of
cruel and unusual punishment is limited strictly to torture and other
forms of physically painful punishment 48 and has held that the con-
cept is a dynamic one that "must draw its meaning from evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."1 49
In his dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont,150 Justice Field
addressed the issue of whether the concept of cruel and unusual
punishment was a dynamic one, and, in the process, set the founda-
tion for the standard by which punishments would be judged by
modem day courts. O'Neil was sentenced to fifty-four years in
prison for unlawfully selling liquor in Vermont. 151 The majority re-
fused to discuss the issue of cruel and unusual punishment. 152 Field
asserted that while the term "cruel and unusual punishment" was
usually applied to the infliction of torture, the prohibition of the
eighth amendment also applied to "all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the of-
fenses charged."' 153 This proportionality test was subsequently
adopted by the Court in Weems v. United States.154
Despite this mandate to set aside disproportionately severe
sentences as unconstitutional, courts have been reluctant to do so
until recently. 155 Courts generally look at three criteria in determin-
ing whether a sentence is excessively severe: 1) How does the sen-
tence for this particular crime compare to sentences given for
crimes that are considered more severe? 2) Is the sentence severe
compared to penalties for the same crime in otherjurisdictions? and
3) Is the penalty illogically severe in the state's overall punishment
148 See, e.g., Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (concluding that "a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth" and thus "we cannot
think that [the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment] was intended to pro-
hibit only practices like the Stuarts, or to only prevent an exact repetition of history").
149 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also, Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (The Court
asserts that the standards of cruel and unusual punishment are constantly changing "as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
150 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
151 Id. at 330.
152 Id. at 331-32.
153 Id. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
154 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
155 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Wyrick, 393 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (upholding a 99
year prison sentence for rape); Sills v. State, 472 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971) (up-
holding a 1000 year sentence for robbery by assault).
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scheme?1 56 Sentences such as sterilization and denationalization for
deserting in times of war have been held to be unconstitutionally
excessive. 157 It has been suggested that fines, prison sentences, and
capital punishment may be the only punishments that are constitu-
tionally permissible.' 58
A strict liability "rough sex" homicide statute may be contested
on the constitutional grounds of cruel and unusual punishment be-
cause the statute imposes the penalty for murder without taking into
account whether or not the defendant possessed the intent to kill.
However, this challenge does not seem to have much validity when
weighed against both the criteria outlined above for holding a par-
ticular sentence unconstitutional and thejudiciary's reluctance to in-
fringe upon the prescribing of sentences, which is generally
regarded as an exclusively legislative function.
The concept of a prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment has been held to prohibit those punishments or methods of
punishment which are seen as "cruel and unusual" in the eyes of
society's evolving standards of decency. This implies that a punish-
ment or method of punishment that is unprecedented and shocking
to society's standards of decency is unconstitutional. The very pres-
ence of strict liability in other parts of the criminal law illustrates
that a strict liability approach is neither unprecedented nor shocking
in relation to society's standards of decency. Rather, strict liability is
a legitimate and accepted method by which to achieve some of the
particularized goals of the criminal law.' 59
Nor is the punishment that would be imposed upon the defend-
ant by the "rough sex" homicide statute disproportionate to the
crime or to the penalties imposed for other homicide offenses. The
"rough sex" homicide statute would subject the defendant to the
penalty for murder instead of the penalty for a lesser homicide of-
fense. These penalties are by nature rationally related, as they con-
cern different degrees of the same offense. If the legislature decides
that "rough sex" homicide deserves to be treated more severely
than other brands of homicide offenses, the upgrading of the pen-
alty for such an offense would not be so out of character with a
state's sentencing scheme, the sentencing schemes of the other
156 J. KLOTrER &J. KANovrrz, CONsTUTONAL LAW FOR POLICE 520 (1977); see, e.g.,
Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975).
157 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (stating that denationalization was a cruelly
degrading form of punishment and one which causes acute mental torment and
suffering).
158 j. KLOTMrR &J. KAovrrz, supra note 156, at 518.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 74-95.
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states, or the goals of the criminal law to justify the judiciary's usur-
pation of the legislature's traditional power to prescribe criminal
sentences.160
IV. CONCLUSION
The "rough sex" defense benefits the defendant by raising two
mitigating inferences in the minds of the jury. As has been illus-
trated, the first of these inferences-that the victim's consent to the
sexual activity that resulted in the homicide should be seen as mak-
ing the defendant less blameworthy for the offense-is without justi-
fication under accepted principles of criminal law. Thus, the
operation of this inference benefits the defendant illegitimately and
should not be permitted.
The second inference-that because the homicide resulted as
an inadvertent consequence of rough sexual activity, the defendant
lacked the intent to kill at the time of the homicide and cannot be
found guilty of murder-is more troublesome. As has been de-
scribed, the prosecution will most likely have extreme difficulty re-
futing these inferences. Further, because these inferences are very
beneficial to the defendant in a murder trial, it is not difficult to im-
agine murder defendants taking advantage of this situation through
perjured reliance on the "rough sex" defense. A strict liability ap-
proach to "rough sex" homicides would eliminate the unjustified
benefits given to the defendant by the first inference, would elimi-
nate the need to prove intent to kill, and would preclude the possi-
bility of murder defendants being rewarded through perjured
reliance on the "rough sex" defense.
GEORGE E. BUZASH
160 See L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 71 (1975);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910).
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